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Questions Presented for Review
The petition for writ of certiorari does not present
questions for review but rather presents an argumentative
statement.

The questions presented for review, expressed in

the terms and circumstances of the case as required by Rule
46(a)(4), would more adequately be stated as follows:
Did the Court of Appeals improperly affirm the District
Courtfs exercise of discretion in denying the appellants
motion for continuance and its motion to compel the taking of
a further deposition of a witness who had been deposed some
months prior?
Does the petition for certiorari raise any question as
to the propriety of the affirmance of the summary judgment
that would warrant review by this Court?
Reference to Reports of Opinions
Issued by the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals opinion is officially reported at
740 P. 2d 275.

A copy of that report is contained in the

appendix to this brief.

The appendix also contains a copy of

the summary judgment entered by the District Court.
Jurisdiction
The order of this Court granting an extension of time
within which the petitioner could file its petition for writ
of certiorari was improvidently granted, and this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition for writ of certiorari
for the reasons set forth in respondents' motion to vacate
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the order granting the extension of time and to dismiss the
petition for writ of certiorari.
Controlling Provisions of Law
Disposition of the case involves application of Rule 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly subparagraphs
(b),

(c), (e) and

(f) of Rule 56.

Rule 56 is set forth

verbatim in the appendix.
Statement of the Case
The Nature of the Case,
The Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition in the Lower Courts
The petitioner's statement of the case is incomplete.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (740 P.2d 275) gives an
adequate statement of the case.

The petitioner's complaint

in

that

the

District

breached

Court

a written

alleged

instrument

the

entitled

respondents

had

"Construction

and

Lease Agreement" and an alleged oral modification of that
agreement.

The District Court found as a matter of law,

based primarily on admissions made by the petitioner itself,
that none of the several conditions precedent stated in the
subject contract had been performed by the petitioner.
Court

of

Appeals

affirmed

and

also

affirmed

denial

The
of

petitioner's belated motion to compel the further deposition
of Mr. Sidney M. Horman.
Petitioner
certiorari

on

does
any

not

rest

asserted

its petition

substantive

for

error.

writ

of

Rather,

petitioner asserts purely procedural error in that it claims
-2-

that the District Court should have granted its motion to
compel the additional deposition of Mr. Horman.
Petitioner does attempt to raise a second point—that
"summary judgment may only be granted when there is no issue
of fact" (Petitionf p. 8) and that "A court [must] . . • take
a view most favorable to the party resisting a Motion for
Summary Judgment"

(Petition, p. 3).

Petitioner does not,

however, even attempt to show how the Court of Appeals or the
District Court in any way failed to follow these rules.

The

mere

any

contention

that

the

rule was violated, without

attempt to show in what way it was violated, is not adequate
ground for certiorari.
Thus, no substantive issue is raised, and we do not
reach on this petition the undisputed facts which clearly
establish

that

not

even

one

had

of

been

the

several

accomplished

different

conditions

precedent

by

the

petitioner.

This is discussed more fully below, but because

the petition shows no evidence in the record on this point,
the statement of facts will not be extended on this point.
On this petition we therefore look solely to petitioner's
contention

that

it

was

somehow

improperly

denied

the

opportunity for further deposing Mr. Horman.
Statement of Facts Relevant
To Issues Presented for Review
On September 9, 1983, plaintiff and petitioner Downtown
Athletic Club, Inc., filed the complaint against respondents
S. M. Horman, S. M. Horman & Sons, and S. M. Horman & Sons
-3-

Company seeking both specific performance and money damages
for an alleged breach of two purported agreements pertaining
to property located in the center of Block 57 in downtown
Salt Lake City. (R. 2-55.)

Even though the complaint was

filed in September of 1983f inexplicably service was not made
until December 6, 1983.
answered

and

principal

(R. 58, 59, and 60.)

counterclaimed

officer

against

David G. Yurth

Respondents

petitioner

and

for declaratory

its

relief,

tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and slander of title.

(R.

75-118.)
Three days after service of the summons and complaint,
petitioner noticed the deposition of Mr. Horman.
Six days after

service of the summons, petitioner

lengthy "Requests for Production of Documents."
Respondents

(R. 71.)

responded

to

the

requests,

filed

served

(R. 61.)
their

own

"Requests for Production of Documents" on January 13, 1984,
and

noticed

through
1983.

David

the
G.

taking

of

Yurth,

the

deposition

its president,

(R. 73, 123-134, 135-147.)

of

on

petitioner

December

15,

Respondents produced all

of the requested documents, and petitioner produced what it
claimed to be all of its corporate records, consisting of
thousands of documents.

The deposition of David G. Yurth was

taken

on

by

respondents

April

2,

1984

(R.

607), and

petitioner took Mr. Horman's deposition on April 26, 1984.
(R. 608.)

-4-

No further discovery was undertaken by petitioner.

On

July 19, 1984, respondents filed their motion for summary
judgment together with supporting affidavits and a memorandum
of points and authorities.

(R. 369 and 322-368.)

same time, notice of hearing

was

served

At the

scheduling

oral

argument on the motion for August 28, 1984, thus providing
petitioner nearly six weeks in which to respond.

(R. 372.)

On August 22, 1984, rather than responding to the motion, and
only five days before the scheduled hearing, petitioner's
counsel moved to withdraw from the case and for a sixty-day
extension
378.)

to

respond

to

motion.

(R. 376,

The District Court granted both motions on August 28,

1984, the date scheduled
380.)

respondents1

for the original hearing.

(R.

Sixty days lapsed, however, without any appearance of

counsel and without any response to the motion for summary
judgment.
On October 26, 1984, respondents served notice pursuant
to

U.C.A.

counsel.

§

78-51-36

(R. 382.)

requiring

On November

petitioner

to

appoint

2, 1984, they renoticed

their motion for summary judgment for hearing on November 16,
1984.

(R. 384.)

Three days prior to the November 16th hearing, Lorin N.
Pace and William B. Parsons III of the firm of Pace, Klimt,
Wunderli
petitioner

&

Parsons
and

filed

notices of depositions.

formally
a

motion

appeared
for

as

counsel

continuance

and

for
nine

(R. 552, 565, 554-561, 568-569, and

579-586.)
-5-

Shortly before the scheduled hearing on November 16,
petitioner
Request

filed what it denominated as an "Extraordinary

for Review" by which it sought a hearing on its

motion for continuance even though that motion was not timely
noticed.

(R. 387.)

At the hearing on the motion for summary

judgment, petitioner requested to be heard on its request for
extraordinary review and motion for continuance.
neither

of

these

motions

had

been

Even though

properly

noticed,

respondents did not object to petitioner being heard, and
petitioner's extraordinary request for review was granted but
its motion for continuance was denied.

Oral argument was

presented on the motion for summary judgment, and the Court
took the motion under advisement, giving petitioner twenty
days in which to file a written response.
On
filing

the
the

twentieth
required

day—December
response

to

(R. 386, 591.)

7, 1984—rather

the motion

for

than

summary

judgment, petitioner filed a motion seeking to compel the
taking of the deposition of only one of the nine depositions
noticed just prior to the hearing.
petitioner

sought only

(R. 393.)

By this motion

to take further deposition of Mr.

Horman, who had previously been deposed in the case.
After having obtained still further extension of time,
on December 10, 1984, petitioner finally filed its memorandum
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment accompanied
by

eight

unsigned.

affidavits,

several

(R. 406-449.)

of

which

were

unsworn

and

Respondents timely submitted their
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reply memorandum (R. 502) and a motion to strike the unsworn,
unsigned,

and

improper

affidavits

Squires, and Maurice Green.

of

(R. 542.)

David

Yurthf

Grant

Petitioner made no

response to the motion to strike, and it did not correct any
of its improper affidavits.
Following the Court's Memorandum Decision of January 23,
1985 (R. 587), its Order and Summary Judgment was entered on
February 6, 1984.
motion

to

further

(R. 590.)
depose

The Court denied petitioner's

Mr.

Horman

(R.

595); granted

respondents1 motion to strike the two unsigned and unsworn
affidavits (the Green and Squires affidavits), the affidavit
of Mr. Yurth purporting to verify the unsigned affidavits,
and those portions of the second Yurth affidavit that did not
comply with Rule 56(e) (R. 596); and granted summary judgment
in favor of the respondents.

(R. 597.)

The District Court

held:
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the
rule, which is the case here, the response must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
"genuine" issue for trial.
Rule 56 requires
judgment if there is no "genuine" issue as to
"material" facts. The motion for summary judment
has been amply supported, as provided in the rule,
and shows that there can be no genuine issue that
plaintiff has failed to comply with several
conditions precedent in the agreements upon which
plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
The plaintiff's response has not shown that there
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
motion for summary judgment must therefore be
granted.
There is no just reason for delay in
entry of this judgment, and summary judgment in
favor of defendants on plaintiff's complaint should
be entered at this time. (R. 596-597.)
-7-

In denying

the motion

to take further

deposition

of Mr,

Horman, the Court noted:
[T]he deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this
case by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26,
1984. Plaintiff, during the entire time that the
motion for summary judgment was pending, made no
further effort to take further deposition of Mr,
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until
the filing of various notices of taking depositions
three days before the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment on November 16, 1984.
The
affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not
state any specific area of inquiry that is
essential to a ruling on the motion for summary
judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this
action and which was not inquired into in the prior
deposition.
There is, therefore, no adequate
showing that the court's prior order denying
plaintiff's motion for continuance should be
altered, and there is no adequate showing that
there is any information material to a disposition
of the motion for summary judgment that has not
previously been covered in the extensive deposition
heretofore taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having
considered said motion and affidavits, hereby
denies the motion to compel further deposition of
Mr. Horman upon the ground that the motion is
contrary to the previous order of the court denying
continuance of the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment and upon the ground that nothing
in the motion or affidavit in support thereof shows
any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of
said motion. (R. 595.)
ARGUMENT
I.

Petitioner Conducted Extensive Discovery
and Showed No Adequate Reason for the
Additional Deposition that it Sought

The petition artfully attempts to create the impression
that the petitioner had not conducted any discovery and was
refused the opportunity for discovery.
page 4, that is not correct.
inaccuracies:

As shown above at

Here are some other examples of

The statement that "[d]efendant would not make
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himself available for deposition . . . "
clearly wrong.

(Petition, p. 5) is

As shown at page 11, below, Mr. Horman had

been thoroughly deposed.

The statement that "many of the

[six] persons [whose affidavits were filed by respondents]
were complete strangers to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff desired
and gave notice of taking their depositions" (Petition, p. 5)
is also inaccurate.

Of the nine depositions

noticed by

petitioner three days before the continued hearing, all were
persons known by petitioner.
did

not

notice

petitioner

did

Most tellingly, the petitioner

the

depositions

not

know—Mr.

of

the

George

only

two

whom

Throckmorton,

a

handwriting expert whose uncontroverted affidavit establishes
that

an

item

of evidence

submitted

by petitioner

was a

forgery, and Mr. Sherman Gillman, an officer of the insurance
company from which petitioner claimed to have obtained a loan
commitment, whose uncontroverted

affidavit established the

total falsity of the unsigned affidavit oi! one Maurice Green,
purported

by

petitioner

to

be

a

loan

officer

of

that

company.
As outlined above, extensive discovery was conducted by
both parties which ended with petitioner's taking of Mr.
Horman1s deposition on April 26, 1984.

After the lapse of

three months, respondents moved for summary judgment on July
19, 1984, and scheduled oral argument for August 28, 1984,
giving

the petitioner

six weeks in which to respond.

A

sixty-day extension of time from August 28, 1984, was granted

-9-

by the District Court upon motion by petitioner.

(R. 380.)

On November 2, 1984, more than four months after filing of
the motion

for

summary

judgment, and

with absolutely

no

action on the part of petitioner to respond to the motion or
otherwise plead, respondents again noticed their motion for
oral argument for November 16, 1984.

At the last minute,

counsel for petitioner moved for a continuance at the time of
the hearing, stating that he could not respond to the motion
and needed additional time to complete the nine depositions
noticed three days before the oral argument.
At the November 16, 1984, hearing, the District Court
considered petitionees extraordinary request for review and
motion for continuance.

(R. 386, 391.)

The request for

review was granted, but the Court declined to continue the
hearing on the motion for summary

judgment, preferring to

hear counsel's position with respect to that motion.
386,

391.)

The Court

did, however, give petitioner

additional twenty days to submit a written response.
386, 391.)

(R.
an
(R.

Petitioner sought and was granted still another

extension to file its memorandum.

It did file within the

twenty days, however, a motion to compel the taking of one of
the nine depositions.

In seeking by motion to compel only

one of the nine depositions, petitioner thereby necessarily
conceded the lack of merit in its prior motion to continue
the

hearing

acknowledged

in
the

order

to

take

appropriateness

-10-

nine
of

the

depositions
District

and

Court's

ruling.

The

sole

deposition

sought

was

the

further

deposition of Mr. Horman, who had previously been deposed
more than seven months prior to the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment.
Petitioner
hearing

on

did

its

not

schedule

motion

to

or

compel.

file

any

notice of

Petitioner's

counsel

offered his affidavit to the effect that the April 26, 1984,
deposition of Mr. Horman was not completed and needed to be
continued.

(R. 395.)

Counsel's affidavit, stated simply,

did not articulate or even suggest any area of inquiry that
was not covered in the prior deposition or that was in need
of further exploration.

There was no indication that even

the unspecified areas of inquiry were relevant to the issues
presented on the motion for summary judgmeht.
The deposition seven months earlier of the 80-year old
Mr. Horman had been exhaustive in both its breadth and depth
of

inquiry

and

consumed

deposition transcript.

an entire day and

243 pages of

As pointed out by the affidavit of

respondents' counsel (R. 402), it was inconceivable that any
further

area

of

relevant

inquiry

could

possibly

exist.

Furthermore, at the end of the deposition session on April
26, 1984, it was clear that the deposition was not continued
indefinitely.

was

noticed,

petitioner's counsel had instructed and required

that Mr.

Horman

and

his

At

the

lawyer

time

be

the

deposition

available

for

two

Schedules were rearranged to meet that demand.
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full days.
Petitioner's

counself

however,

obviously

having

exhausted

every

conceivable avenue of inquiryf and having cross-examined the
witness

with

reference

to

eighteen

document

exhibits,

abruptly terminated the deposition at 4:30 p.m. on the first
day and advised that he did not wish to proceed further at
that time.

It was made clear that Mr. Horman was prepared to

proceed further that day and the next day as scheduled by
petitioner's counsel, but petitioner chose not to proceed.
(R. 402.)
Faced with the necessity of producing some reasonable
objection to the District Court's ruling, in light of the
District Court's lenient permission in granting extensions of
time to respond in writing to respondents' motion for summary
judgmentf

counsel for petitioner endeavored to justify its

demand for the further deposition of Mr. Horman.
of

Mr.

Horman's

counsel

availability

as demanded

absence

any

of

need

reciting

the

witness's

by petitioner's

for

further

Statements
previous

counsel and the

deposition

were

not

challenged by petitioner.

If petitioner seriously believed

that

was continued and that further

the prior

inquiry

was

deposition

necessary,

it

should

have

acted

promptly

to

complete its inquiry rather than wait more than seven months
to

raise

the

issue.

A

deposition

cannot

be

continued

indefinitely.
In challenging this ruling, petitioner cites here, as it
did in the Court of Appeals, Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311,
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313 (Utah 1984), and Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d
376 (Utah 1977), which it claims stand for the proposition
that it is an abuse of discretion to enter summary judgment
where discovery is not completed.
In order to properly consider petitioner's challenge of
the

rulings

below,

it

is

essential

to

establish

petitioner is contending and what is not at issue.
petitioner

has

not

contended

that

it

was

what
First,

denied

an

opportunity under Rule 56(f) to obtain affidavits or other
discovery to oppose the motion for summary judgment, as was
the case
present

in Cox
to

the

v. Winters, supra.
Court,

as

required

Petitioner
by

Rule

did not

56(f),

any

acceptable "reason" why it either needed the specific nine
depositions it noticed at the last minute, and thereafter
abandoned
deposition
without

when

it

sought

by

motion

of Mr. Horman, or why

to compel

it could

not

only

the

present,

those depositions, facts essential to justify its

opposition to respondents' motion.

It did not present an

affidavit of any handwriting expert to counter the affidavit
of Mr. Throckmorton establishing

that one of petitioner's

exhibits was a forgery, nor did petitioner even seek to take
the deposition of Mr. Throckmorton.

Petitioner did not seek

to take the deposition of the affiant from the insurance
company, whose affidavit showed the total falsity of one of
the unsigned affidavits presented by petitioner.
of deposition

were obviously

not

-13-

related

The notices

to respondents'

motion for summary judgment.
and

thereby

taking.

waived

any

Petitioner did not pursue them

claimed

right

to

compel

their

The unsigned affidavits submitted by petitioner with

Mr. Yurth's

assurances

that

the affiants

would

sign the

affidavits if they could have been found are not proper under
Rule

56(e) and

suspension
judgment

of

do

not

invoke Rule

consideration

until

the

of

signatures

56(f) to require the

the

motion

could

be

for

summary

obtained.

No

acceptable "reason" was presented why the signatures were not
obtained.

In addition, Mr. Yurth's

assurances

that

the

affiants would sign the prepared affidavits is disingenuous,
because the affiants in reality either could not or would not
sign them.

For example, Mr. Maurice Green could not have

signed

affidavit

the

absolutely clear

prepared

for

him

because

(R.

Transamerica
officer

319)

that

Occidental

and

never

Mr.

Green

Life

was

Insurance

obtained

a

loan

Life

never
Company

Insurance

employed

Squires,

a

local

resident,

who

commitment

has

by

as a loan

Transamerica as represented in his unsigned affidavit.
Grant

is

from the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr.

Sherman Gillman of Transamerica Occidental
Company

it

always

from
Mr.
been

available for signing the affidavit prepared by petitioner,
informed respondents1
that proffered

counsel that he had refused to sign

affidavit.

Thus, there is no appropriate

claim under Rule 56(f) for affidavits or discovery to oppose
respondents' motion since petitioner has never presented an

-14-

acceptable reason why the motion should not have been heard
until certain affidavits or discovery are obtained.
Since Rule 56(f) is not at issue, the only issue that
petitioner

raises

is

that

it must

be permitted

discovery on issues not material to the summary
matter.

general
judgment

The cases cited by petitioner in support of this

proposition. Cox and Auerbach's, hold almost completely the
opposite.
In Cox the court quoted Strand v. Associated Students of
University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977), citing 6,
Part 2, Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.) § 56.24, pp. 561424 to 15-1426 [sic], and stated:
Where, howeverf the party opposing summary judgment
timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f)
stating reasons why he is presently unable to
proffer evidentiary affidavits he directly and
forthrightly
invokes
the
trial
court's
discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit,
the motion should be liberally treated. Exercising
a sound discretion the trial court then determines
whether the stated reasons are adequate. (Emphasis
added.)
Although petitioner's motion was not denominated as a Rule
56(f) motion, it was so considered by the Court of Appeals,
but the Court rightly held that the motion gave no adequate
reason for the additional discovery, was not timely, and was
nothing more than a "fishing expedition."
279.)

(740 P.2d at 278,

Neither the motion or the supporting affidavit gave

any reason why the proposed depositions had any relevance to
the motion for summary judgment.
that

petitioner's

notices

and
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It can hardly be contested
motion

to

compel

were

dilatory.

They were both filed more than four months after

the motion for summary judgment was filed and seven months
after the last discovery was taken.

Finallyf Cox admonishes

the

in

exercise

"reasons

of

stated

sound
for

discretion

additional

determining

discovery

are

if

the

adequate."

Here, where no reasons whatever were offered, the Court of
Appeals properly affirmed the District Court.
Cox and Auerbach1s recognize three other instances where
the entry of summary judgment in the face of requests for
discovery would be an abuse of discretion:

first, where

there has "not been sufficient time since the inception of
the lawsuit for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures,
and thereby have an opportunity to cross examine the moving
party";

second,

where

"discovery

proceedings

were

timely

initiated, but never afforded an appropriate response"; and
third, where

discovery

presented

the motion

in

sought
for

is

relevant

summary

to the

judgment

and

issues
not a

"'fishing expedition' for purely speculative evidence after
substantial discovery has been conducted without producing
any significant

evidence."

(I_d. at 313-314.)

See also,

First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391
U.S. 253 (1968), cited in Cox v. Winters, supra, at n. 9.
These instances have no application here other than to
underscore that the District Court properly exercised its
discretion.

Petitioner had ample time to complete discovery

in the eleven months

after

suit was filed and prior to
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respondents1

filing of its motion.

Again, petitioner did

nothing in the three months prior to filing of the motion and
then did nothing the following four months.
that

respondents

did

not

follow

the

It is noteworthy

practice

of

some

litigants, who give only the shortest possible notice for
hearing on a motion for summary judgment, but gave nearly six
weeks1 notice; that the hearing was continued at petitioner's
request an additional sixty days; and that even the second
notice of hearing gave petitioner more than two weeks in
which

to respond.

The last minute filing of notices of

deposition just before the hearing on the motion is clearly
dilatory.

There was no outstanding, unresponded to discovery

in existence prior to the filing of the motion for summary
judgment as was found in both Cox and Auerbach's.

In those

cases, the outstanding discovery went to various issues under
consideration in the motion, and thus it was not proper for
the court to enter summary judgment until the discovery was
properly responded to.
and

fairly

petitioner

responded

Here, however, respondents had openly
to

had not only

all

discovery

propounded,

the opportunity but did

"cross examine the moving party."

and

in fact

Petitioner's last minute

attempt to give the appearance that discovery was incomplete
was

shown

proceeding.

for

what

it

was—an

attempt

to

delay

the

Petitioner's abandonment of its untimely filed

discovery, with its motion to compel being directed only to
Mr. Horman's further deposition, demonstrates that the entire
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proposal

was

nothing

more

than

a

"fishing

expedition"

frequently utilized to avoid the salutary impact of summary
judgment—a practice the courts will not sanction.

Cox v.

Winters, 678 P.2d 311f 314 (Utah 1984), citing First National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298
(1968).
The

District

Court

gave

careful

consideration

petitioner's efforts to delay the hearing.

to

Since petitioner

offered no reasons for the untimely discovery demands or its
relevance

to

issues

raised

in

the

motion

for

summary

judgment, petitioner's motions were properly denied.

The

Court did, however, withhold decision and gave petitioner
liberal opportunity to make written response.

That decision

is above reproach.
II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Properly Affirmed the Summary Judgment
Petitioner's
merely

states

second

rules

argument

of

law with

is a non-argument.
which

It

there can be no

argument, but it does not show that the Court of Appeals in
any way violated those rules.

Neither the Court of Appeals

nor the District Court made any findings of fact, but each
concluded

on

judgment

was

the

basis

of

undisputed

appropriate.

Contrary

fact
to

that

summary

petitioner's

assertion, the Court of Appeals specifically recognized and
followed the rule requiring it to review facts and inferences
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
judgment was granted.

740 P.2d at 278.
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While petitioner

contends that the "facts have been controverted," there is no
reference in the petition to even one of the facts found to
be undisputed that the petitioner has "controverted."
56

requires

that

there

be

a

"genuine"

issue

as

Rule
to a

"material" fact.

Unsigned, unsworn affidavits do not create

genuine issues.

Forged instruments do not create genuine

issues.

A contention that financing had been obtained, which

contention

is based

proffered

by

company,

raises

on an unsigned

a supposed
no

lending

issue

of

affidavit purportedly

officer
fact

of an

whatever;

insurance
but

even

proffering such an affidavit raises serious questions when
the proper affidavit of an officer of that insurance company
establishes that the man was not so employed and that no such
loan commitment

was ever made.

There is nothing

in the

petition, just as there was nothing in either Court below, to
controvert

the

studies were
City.

undisputed

never

fact

completed

that

and

required

never

engineering

submitted

to the

So it is also with respect to each one of the other

conditions precedent.
The petition cites no fact whatever that was properly
controverted

or

genuinely

placed

in

issue.

The

mere

statement in the petition for writ of certiorari that there
are issues does not create issues.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari does not present any
special and important

reason (as required by Rule 43) why
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this Court should exercise its discretion to review the wellconsidered

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals.

Sound

discretion was exercised by the District Court in denying the
untimely

request

to

further

depose

a

party

previously

deposed.

No reason whatever was given for the reopening of

the deposition, and there was no showing in either of the
Courts below, and

there

is none here, that

the proposed

additional discovery was directed to any issue material to
the motion for summary judgment.

The petition recites that

there were questions of fact, but there is not here, just as
there was not in the Court of Appeals, any citation to any
fact established, or that could be established, by affidavit
or by deposition or document, which would have established a
genuine issue as to any material fact.
was

based

on

unrebutted

The judgment below

affidavits,

petitioner's

own

documents, and admissions in the deposition of petitioner's
own officer.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is sound,

and the petition here presents no ground for review.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this 12th day of November, 1987.
CHAPMAN AND JGUTIJER

L. R^jSaxStfier, Jr.
Thomas R. Vuksinick
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson.

Billings, Judge:
Appellant, Downtown Athletic Club ("DAC") appeals from the
district court*s judgment denying its motion to continue and
its motion to compel further discovery, and granting
respondents1 (jointly referred to as ••Horman*1) motion for
summary judgment. DAC contends that the trial court erred in
ruling as a matter of law that the conditions precedent to the
parties9 agreement were not satisfied thus discharging Hormanfs
obligation to perform. We affirm.
DAC executed a written agreement with S. M. Horman on May
8, 1981 entitled ••Construction & Lease Agreement for the
Downtown Athletic Club- (-Construction & Lease Agreement-).
This agreement provided that Horman would construct athletic

APPENDIX NO,
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clubs and then sublease the clubs to DAC. The Construction -&
Lease Agreement delineated several conditions precedent to
Horman*s obligation to perform:
1. Horman would construct improvements to the Harver
Warehouse Building provided that the Harver Warehouse
Building could be reinforced at a price that was
acceptable to both Horman and DAC# and in a manner
that would satisfy the building code requirements of
the Salt Lake City Building Department.
2. Horman was to commence construction only after
confirmed receipt and acceptance by Horman of
construction financing acceptable to Horman, and the
entire lease was specifically subject to Horman being
able to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to
exceed 12% per annum and that DAC should pay all
annual interest charges in excess of 12% per annum
provided Horman did decide to pay a higher interest
rate than 12%.
3. DAC had use of office space in the old Kress
Building only if it paid the nominal rent of $1.00 per
month•
4. Horman was obligated to construct the athletic
clubs only if DAC sold a sufficient number of
memberships prior to beginning construction of the
athletic clubs in order to guarantee that the payments
required by the Construction & Lease Agreement would
be paid.
5. DAC was to assign dues income of individual
membership contracts/ by contract number, to a special
account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease payments to verify that there were sufficient
funds available.
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the
Construction & Lease Agreement by including an assignment of
part of Horman*s leasehold interest in the Harver Warehouse
Building to DAC. This oral agreement also contained conditions
precedent most of which were identical to those enumerated in
the Construction & Lease Agreement:
1. The owners of the Harver Warehouse Building had to
completely and absolutely release Horman from all
obligations under the lease and accept DAC as the new
lessee in place of Horman.
2. Engineering studies had to be completed and
approved by Salt Lake City for the renovation of the
Harver Building.
860109-CA
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3. Adequate financing for the completion of the «
construction of the athletic club(s) had to be secured.
Horman served notice on DAC to "quit the premises" after it
sold some of the subject property to the Salt Lake Acquisition
Group. Consequently, DAC filed suit against Horman on seeking
specific performance and damages for breach of the written and
oral agreements. Horman filed its answer and counterclaim for
declaratory judgment, tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and
slander of title on January 6, 1984.
Comprehensive discovery ensued with each party producing
hundreds of documents. Discovery ended with the depositions of
the two principals. David Yurth, president of DAC, was deposed
on April 2, 1984 resulting in a 283 page transcript, 36
exhibits, and over 13 pages of corrections. S. M. Hormanfs
deposition was taken April 26, 1984 resulting in a 245 page
transcript and several exhibits. No further discovery was
conducted by either party.
Horman filed its motion for summary judgment together with
supporting affidavits and a memorandum of points and
authorities on July 19, 1984, nearly two months after the last
deposition was taken and when there were no outstanding
discovery requests. Oral argument on the motion was scheduled
for August 28, 1984. On August 22, 1984, six days before the
motion was to be argued, DAC's counsel moved to withdraw and
requested a 60-day extension to respond to Hormanfs motion.
The district court granted both of these requests.
Sixty days elapsed without an appearance from DAC and
without response to the motion. Consequently, on October 26,
1984, Horman served written notice on DAC pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-51-36 (1978) requesting that it either appoint
counsel or appear in person. On November 2, 1984, Horman
renoticed its motion for summary judgment and scheduled the
hearing for November 16, 1984. On November 13, 1984, DAC's new
counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for
continuance, an ••extraordinary request for review," and noticed
nine depositions all of which were scheduled after the
scheduled oral argument on Horman*s summary judgment motion.
On November 16, 1984, the district court heard oral
argument on DACfs motion to continue and Horman#s motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied DAC*s motion to
continue, took Horman*s motion for summary judgment under
advisement, and gave DAC an additional twenty days to file a
written response to Hormanfs motion for summary judgment. On
December 6, 1984, DAC filed a motion to compel discovery
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seeking to -continue- S. M. Horman*s deposition.1 DAC's
motion to compel was supported by an affidavit claiming the
need for further discovery. After receiving several
continuances, DAC filed its memorandum in opposition to
Hormanfs motion for summary judgment on December 10, 1984
together with eight affidavits, some of which were unsworn and
unsigned.
The district court denied DAC's motion to compel further
deposing of S. M. Horman and granted Hormanfs motion for
summary judgment holding that the oral agreement was void under
the statute of frauds and that Horman was excused from
performing under the Construction & Lease Agreement because
none of the conditions precedent had been performed. This
appeal followed.
Three issues are raised on appeal. First, did the lower
court abuse its discretion in denying DACfs motion to continue
and its motion to compel further discovery? Second, is the
oral modification of the Construction & Lease Agreement void
under the statute of frauds and, if not, do the uncontested
facts demonstrate that Horman was excused from performing under
the terms of the modification? Third, did the lower court err
in granting Horman's motion for summary judgment ruling that
Horman was excused from performing under the Construction &
Lease Agreement as DAC failed to satisfy the requisite
conditions precedent?
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to DAC, the party against whom the judgment was
granted. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987).
I.
The first issue we must address is whether the trial court
erred in denying DAC the opportunity to conduct further
discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. Generally,
summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is
incomplete since information sought in discovery may create
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the
motion. Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah
1977). However, a court should deny a motion to continue if
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without
merit. See id.
1. Hormanfs counsel refused to allow S. M. Horman, an 80
year-old man who already had been subjected to extensive
cross-examination during the initial deposition, to undergo yet
further deposing until the trial court had ruled on its summary
judgment motion.
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Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party opposing summary judgment may submit an affidavit
stating the reasons why he is presently unable to present
evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to
summary judgment. If the court finds the reasons to be
adequate, the court may, among other things, order that further
discovery be conducted and continue the summary judgment
motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d
311, 313-14 (Utah 1984), delineated several factors to consider
under Rule 56(f):
1. Were the reasons articulated in the
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the
party against whom summary judgment is
sought merely on a "fishing expedition"
for purely speculative facts after
substantial discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant evidence?
2. Was there sufficient time since the
inception of the lawsuit for the party
against whom summary judgment is sought to
use discovery procedures, and thereby
cross-examine the moving party?
3. If discovery procedures were timely
initiated, was the non-moving party
afforded an appropriate response?
Applying the foregoing legal principles, we find that the
district court properly denied DACfs motion to compel further
deposing of S. M. Horman and its motion to continue the summary
judgment hearing. Both parties conducted extensive discovery.
Hundreds of documents were produced. Lengthy depositions were
taken. The record reveals that DAC failed to conduct further
discovery although it had ample time and opportunity to do so.
Discovery essentially ended on April 26, 1984. Three months
elapsed before Horman filed its motion for summary judgment.
During this three-month period DAC conducted no further
discovery. DAC was given six weeks before oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment in which to conduct any necessary
discovery. Again, DAC sought no further discovery. DAC was
also granted an additional 60-day extension specifically to
respond to Horman•s motion when DAC's original counsel withdrew
five days before oral argument was scheduled. These additional
60 days lapsed without DAC entering an appearance or seeking
any additional discovery.
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On November 2, 1984# nearly four months after Horman,filed
its initial motion for summary judgment# and with no action by
DAC to respond to the motion, Horman again noticed its motion
for summary judgment and scheduled oral argument for November
16, 1984 providing DAC yet another two weeks to respond to its
motion. Three days prior to the scheduled oral argument, DAC's
new counsel appeared and finally sought additional discovery by
noticing nine depositions (scheduled after oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment).
On December 6, 1984, DAC moved to compel the appearance of
S. M. Horman to continue his deposition. DAC's motion to
compel discovery was accompanied by an affidavit by its counsel
claiming the need for further discovery.2 This affidavit,
however, is deficient as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. It fails to
articulate any material area of inquiry not covered by the
original deposition of S. M. Horman. Rather, DAC's counsel
merely states:
Having read the Horman deposition there are a
number of areas into which Mr. Zoll [DAC's
original counsel] did not inquire and
disposition of this case in a prompt and
reasonable manner depends upon prompt access
to the information and alleged testimony
which will be given by Mr. Horman.

There are a number of issues into which the
Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Zoll did not inquire
and notice was given at the end of the day
that the deposition was being continued.
We believe that DAC's counsel was simply on a ••fishing
expedition" for purely speculative facts after substantial
discovery had been conducted without producing any significant
evidence. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313, 314. Moreover,
DAC had sufficient time and opportunity before the summary
judgment motion was argued to conduct discovery and in fact did
so.
We also are of the opinion that DAC had ample
opportunity to cross-examine S. M. Horman during his initial
deposition. The deposition took an entire day. At the initial
2. DAC did not identify its affidavit as a Rule 56(f)
affidavit. However, the substance of the affidavit suggests it
was intended to be such. We are controlled by substance, not
captions. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348
(Utah 1983). Therefore, we will treat DAC#s affidavit as a Rule
56(f) affidavit.
860109-CA
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deposition DACfs original counsel requested that S. M. Horman
and his counsel be available for two full days. Schedules were
rearranged to meet this request. The deposition was stopped,
abruptly at 4:45 p.m. on the first day. Horman was prepared to
proceed further that day and the next as scheduled by DAC's
counsel. DAC's counsel, however, chose not to proceed.
By way of summary, the record indicates that DAC had
over a year to conduct discovery and had been given several
continuances and extensions by the trial judge. DAC did not
articulate any specific factual area which needed further
probing. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court reasonably concluded that no further factual development
was necessary and properly denied DAC's motion to compel and
its compel to continue.
II.
Next, we must determine if the trial court correctly
found that the alleged oral modificationc of the Construction &
Lease Agreement did not preclude Horman s motion for summary
judgment.
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the
written contract, a contention which Horman disputes, by
including an assignment by Horman of part of its leasehold
interest in the Harver Warehouse Building to DAC. Both parties
agree that Horman contemplated assigning its interest in the
masterlease only if Horman was completely released by the
owners of the Harver Warehouse Building from all obligations
under the lease. The alleged oral modification also contained
two other conditions precedent which were identical to those
identified in the Construction & Lease Agreement. First, DAC
was required to secure Hadequate" construction and long-term
financing, and second, DAC was to provide acceptable
engineering reports to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate
building permit to reinforce and reconstruct the Harver
Warehouse Building.
DAC concedes that when the statute of frauds requires a
contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1984), any
alteration or modification must also be in writing. Zion's
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975).
DAC, however, argues that the oral modification of the
Construction & Lease Agreement was removed from the bar of the
statute of frauds under the doctrine of partial performance.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1984).
DAC alleges that it partly performed the oral
modification by attempting to secure the specified construction
and long-term financing, by selling memberships to the clubs,
and by retaining firms to perform the engineering studies. All
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of the acts alleged, including the engineering studies an$ the
financing, were not exclusively referable to the oral
modification but were also required under the original
Construction & Lease Agreement and thus would not remove the
oral modification from the statute of frauds. See McDonald v.
Barton Bros. Inv. Corp.. 631 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1981). More
importantly, however, even if the oral modification was
enforceable, DAC's position still fails. As more fully
developed in section III of this opinion, the conditions
precedent to the oral modification were not satisfied and thus
Hormanfs obligation to perform under the oral modification
never arose.
III.
The third issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in concluding as a matter of law that none of the
conditions precedent to the written contract were satisfied
thus excusing Horman's obligation to perform.
It is undisputed that all the conditions precedent to
the Construction & Lease Agreement had to be satisfied before
Horman became obligated to construct and ultimately lease the
athletic clubs to DAC. If one condition was not satisfied,
Horman was excused from performing.3 A review of the record
discloses that DAC failed to satisfy several of the conditions
precedent to the written agreement.
As previously discussed, Horman was to make improvements
provided that the Harver Warehouse Building could be reinforced
at a price that was acceptable to both parties, and in a manner
that would satisfy the requirements of the Salt Lake City
Building Department. This provision really contains two
conditions precedent involving engineering studies.
Engineering studies had to be completed before the cost of
reinforcement could be determined and before the Building
Department could consider whether to issue the appropriate
permit.
The undisputed facts in the record indicate that
although DAC attempted to have engineering studies performed on
the Harver Warehouse Building, no final engineering study was
3. The Construction & Lease Agreement did not contain an
express "time is of the essence" provision. Therefore, DAC had
a reasonable time under the circumstances in which to satisfy
the conditions precedent. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d
1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). The agreement was executed on May 8,
1981. DAC filed its complaint on September 9, 1983.
Therefore, DAC had over two years to satisfy the conditions.
Neither party questioned whether this was a sufficient amount
of time for DAC to perform.
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in fact completed much less submitted to the City for
approval.
DAC originally retained Bonneville Engineering to
conduct the engineering studies. DAC later retained Scott
Evans# managing partner of Cornwall Evans & Fife# architects.
Evans in turn hired Ronald Weber of Weber & Associates to
conduct the requisite engineering studies and determine costs.
Scott Evans, in a sworn affidavit, claims that he hired a
structural engineer to "suggest appropriate engineering
upgrades or structural reinforcements" as required by the
City. Scott Evans/ however, merely states that the "results"
of the engineering study and recommendations for structural
reinforcement and preliminary drawings were presented to Roger
Evans/ assistant director of the Department of Building &
Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation. Scott Evans
admits that Roger Evans, in a meeting, required final working
drawings of the suggested engineering solutions. Conspicuously
absent from Scott Evans' affidavit is his sworn statement that
he did in fact submit the final engineering drawings and
seismic analysis to the City and that they were approved.
Roger Evans, the assistant director of the Department of
Building & Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation, in
his affidavit, states that DAC never submitted any plans,
specifications, engineering reports or the requested seismic
analysis to the Department. In light of Roger Evans* and Scott
Evans' affidavits, it is uncontroverted that the requisite
engineering studies were never submitted to the City.
Consequently, the cost of reinforcement of the Harver Warehouse
Building could not be determined and the City could not approve
such reinforcement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
conclusion that this condition precedent was not satisfied and
Horman's obligation to perform under either the original
Construction & Lease Agreement or the alleged oral modification
was excused.
Having found that this one condition precedent has not
been performed, we decline to address whether DAC satisfied any
other conditions because, as previously discussed, all the
conditions precedent had to be satisfied before Horman's
performance was required.
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Affirmed.

Costs to Horman.

Judith M, Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

R. W. Garff, Judge
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ORDER
and
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly
for hearing, pursuant to notice, on November

16, 1984.

The

plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Mr. Lorin N. Pace, Mr.
William B. Parsons III, and Mr. G. Randall Klimt, of the firm of
Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons. Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr., and Mr.
David B. Thomas, of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown,
represented the defendants.
At the hearing, plaintifffs counsel presented to the Court a
motion to extend time

for hearing on the motion for summary

judgment and also presented a motion for extraordinary review,
requesting that the motion to extend time for hearing be heard
even though proper notice had not been given as required by the
rules.

Although neither of said motions was in the file before

the Court and proper notice had not been given, counsel foi
defendants indicated that although these motions had only beer
served

upon

him

three

and

two

days

before

the

hearing

respectively, he had no objection to their being heard.

Th

plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review was therefore grante
and arguments were presented on plaintiff's motion to continu
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

Noting that th

plaintiff had had an extraordinarily long time for preparation fc
this hearing, the motion for summary judgment having been fil€
and served on July 19, 1984, and a substantial extension of tir
having

previously

been

granted,

and

there

being

no adequa^

showing as to why the matter should be further continued, t
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court denied the motion to continue the hearing but, after hearing
arguments of counsel on the motion for summary judgment, did grant
the plaintiff an additional twenty days within which to file a
written

memorandum

in

opposition

to

the

motion

for

summary

judgment.
The time for filing of a memorandum by the plaintiff would
have expired on December 6, 1984, but an additional extension of
time until December 10, 1984, was granted.

Counsel for plaintiff

did, however, file on December 6, 1984, a motion to compel the
deposition of Mr. S. M. Horman andean affidavit of plaintiff's
counsel in support of that motion.

Defendants1 counsel filed on

December 7, 1984, a responsive affidavit.
The plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment on December 10, 1984, together with eight
affidavits, two of which are unsigned and unsworn.

Defendants

timely filed a reply memorandum on December 17, 1984, together
with

a

motion

seeking

an

motion

for

order

to

strike

certain

of

the

which

was

affidavits.
Plaintiff's

extraordinary

review,

granted at the November 16, 1984, hearing and plaintiff's motion
to continue hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was
denied at the November 16, 1984, hearing are hereby confirmed.
There remain three motions for disposition by this
Summary Judgment:
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Order and

1.

The plaintiff's "Motion to Compel Discovery" which seeks

to take further deposition of defendant S. M. Horman;
2.

The defendants' "Motion to Strike Affidavits"?

3.

The defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment."

In rendering this order and judgment the following matters
are particularly noted:
The motion for summary judgment was filed and served

by the

defendants on July 19, 1984, and at that time a notice of hearing
was also filed and served giving notice of hearing on August 28,
1984, thereby giving 42 days notice of .hearing.

A memorandum and

seven supporting affidavits were filed and served simultaneously
with the motion.

Thereafter, approximately one week before the

scheduled hearing, Mr. B. Ray Zoll, who was then counsel for the
plaintiff in this case, presented to the Court an ex parte motion
for permission to withdraw as counsel and for extension of time
for the plaintiff to obtain other counsel and to respond to the
motion for summary judgment.
by written

order

prepared

The court granted that motion and,
by

counsel

for

plaintiff, granted

plaintiff sixty days within which to obtain other counsel and tc
file a proper response to the motion for summary judgment.
No

appearance

of counsel

was made within

the

period, and no response was filed to the motion
judgment.

sixty-da}

for summary

On October 26, 1984, the defendants served a notice

pursuant to Section 36, Chapter 51, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated,
requiring the plaintiff to appear by counsel or in person.
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notice of hearing was served on November 2, 1984, setting the
motion for summary judgment to be heard on November 16, 1984.
Prior to the appearance of Mr. Pace as counsel in this case, the
court received from Mr. David Yurth a letter reciting, among other
things, that he had contacted a number of law firms but had been
unable to obtain representation.
It

is

also

noted

that

the

deposition

of

plaintiff's

president, Mr. Yurth, was taken in this case on April 2, 1984, and
that plaintiff took the deposition of defendant S. M. Horman on
April 26, 1984.

Plaintiff's taking of the deposition of Mr,

Horman on April 26, 1984, appears to have been the last activity
of the plaintiff in this case prior to the hearing on the motion
for summary judgment and the entrance of the appearance of Mr.
Pace three days before that hearing.
The Court has necessarily taken more time than would be
suggested by the mandate of Rule 56 that summary judgment, where
appropriate, be granted "forthwith," because of the desire to give
plaintiff ample opportunity to properly respond to the motion and
because of the necessity to review the extensive memorandums and
affidavits filed.

Having now considered arguments of counsel, the

affidavits, memoranda, and other pleadings, and having previously
rendered a memorandum decision, this Order and Summary Judgment is
now entered to formalize the rulings.
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In ruling upon the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, it
is noted that the deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984.

Plaintiff,

during the entire time that the motion for summary judgment was
pending, made no further effort to take further deposition of Mr.
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until the filing of
various

notices

of

taking

depositions

three

days before the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 1984.
The affidavit

filed by plaintiff's counsel does not state any

specific area of inquiry that is essential to a ruling on the
motion for summary judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this
action and which was not inquired into in the prior deposition.
There is, therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior
order

denying

altered, and

plaintiff's

motion

for

continuance

should

be

there is no adequate showing that there is any

information material to a disposition of the motion for summary
judgment that has not previously been covered in the extensive
deposition heretofore taken of Mr. Horman.

The Court, having

I

considered said motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground that the
motion is contrary to the previous order of the court denying
continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and
upon the ground that nothing in the motion or affidavit in support
thereof shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of
said motion.
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In ruling upon the defendants' motion to strike certain of
the affidavits filed by plaintiff, it is noted that the documents
headed

"Affidavit

of Maurice

Green" and

"Affidavit

of Grant

Squires" are unsigned and unsworn, that the "Affidavit of David
Yurth as to the affidavits of Grant Squires, Maurice Green and
Todd Marx" is an improper affidavit seeking to introduce thereby
the testimony contained in otherwise unsigned affidavits, and that
the other affidavit of David Yurth contains conclusions of law,
hearsay

evidence,

and

admissible in evidence.

other

statements

which

would

not

be

Even without defendants' motion strike,

said affidavits are not in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 56(e) and therefore could not in any event be considered in
ruling upon the motion for summary judgment.
considered the

The Court, having

motion to strike and the affidavits to which it is

directed, hereby grants the motion to strike, and the purported
affidavits of Grant Squires and Maurice Green, the affidavit of
David Yurth pertaining to the Squires and Green affidavits, and
the portions of the affidavit of David Yurth to which the motion
is directed are hereby stricken.
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported, as provided in the rule, which is the case
here, the response must set forth specific facts showing thai
there is a "genuine" issue for trial.

Rule 56 requires judgmeni

if there is no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts. The motioi
for summary judment has been amply supported, as provided in th<
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rule, and shows that there can be no genuine issue that plaintiff
has failed to comply with several conditions precedent

in the

agreements upon which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the
alleged

oral

agreement

or

modification

requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

fails

to

meet

the

The plaintiff's response

has not shown that there is a genuine issue as to any material
fact, and

the motion

for summary

granted.

There is no just reason for delay in entry of this

judgment,

and

summary

judgment

judgment

in

favor

must

of

therefore be

defendants

on

plaintiff's complaint should be entered'at this time.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that

the plaintiff's

motion to take additional

deposition of

defendant Horman is denied; the defendant's motion to strike the
affidavits of Maurice Green, Grant Squires, the affidavit of David
Yurth pertaining

to those affidavits, and the portions of the

second Yurth affidavit specified in said motion is granted, and
said affidavits and portions of the Yurth affidavit are hereby
stricken; and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff on the complaint in this
action,
prejudice

and
and

the

complaint

plaintiff

herein

shall

is

hereby

take nothing

dismissed

thereby, and this

judgment shall now be entered.

DATED this fl? day o f - ^ K y ^ 1985.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE!
This is to certify that the foregoing Order and Summary
Judgment was served upon the plaintiff and counterdefendants
herein by mailing

a true and correct copy thereof to Lorin

N. Pace, of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons, 1200
University Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

Zj/

day of January, 1985.

RULE 56

Utah Roles of Civil Procedure

No judgment by default shall be entered against
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
RULE 56. SlJMMARY JUDGMENT
(•) For Claimant.
(b) For Defeadiag Party.
(c) Motion Bad Proceedings Taereoa.
(d) Case Not Fally Adjudicated oa Motto*.
(c) Form of Affidavits; Farther Teanaoay; Defease
Required.
(f) Waea Affidavits are Unavailable.
(g) Affidavits Made ia Bad Faith.

(a) For Claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
twenty days from the commencement of the action
or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidaviu for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party.
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fally Adjudicated on Motion.
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defease
Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidaviu to be sup-
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plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific
facts snowing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidaviu to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
(g) Affidaviu Made In Bad Faith.
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of the affidaviu presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidaviu caused him to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A.
1953, shall be in accordance with these Rules, and
the right to trial by jury may be demanded under
the circumstances and in the manner provided in
Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court
may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
(a) Jadgmeat Upoa the Verdict of a Jary.
(b) Jadgmeat ia Otaer Cases.
(c) Waea Jadgmeat Eatered; Notation fat
Actio** aad Jadgmeat Docket.
(d) Notice of Sigaing or Eatrv of Jadgateat.
(e) Jadgaeai After Death of a Party.
(f) Jadgmeat ay Coafoadoa.

(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jary.
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to
the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the
verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the
clerk and filed. If there is' a special verdict or a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the
court shall direct the appropriate judgment which
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk andTiled.
(b) Judgment In Other Cases.
Except as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and
subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of
Actions and Judgment Docket.
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a
lien on real property, when the same is signed and

For Annotations, consult CODEOCO'S Annotation Service
APPENDIX NO, 3
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